From ac17a556bd50969c8157d50761449b702afa4af8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luke Howard Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 16:59:55 +1100 Subject: port new RADIUS library to Windows Conflicts: lib/configure.ac lib/include/radsec/radsec.h lib/radius/client.h --- lib/radius/Makefile.am | 4 +- lib/radius/attrs.c | 2 +- lib/radius/client.h | 18 +- lib/radius/custom.c | 76 ++++ lib/radius/id.c | 5 +- lib/radius/packet.c | 916 ------------------------------------------------- lib/radius/parse.c | 15 +- lib/radius/print.c | 1 + lib/radius/radpkt.c | 916 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/radius/valuepair.c | 10 +- 10 files changed, 1028 insertions(+), 935 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 lib/radius/packet.c create mode 100644 lib/radius/radpkt.c (limited to 'lib/radius') diff --git a/lib/radius/Makefile.am b/lib/radius/Makefile.am index 1b66ca6..b57ef16 100644 --- a/lib/radius/Makefile.am +++ b/lib/radius/Makefile.am @@ -12,13 +12,13 @@ libradsec_radius_la_SOURCES = \ custom.c \ dict.c \ id.c \ - packet.c \ parse.c \ print.c \ + radpkt.c \ static.c \ valuepair.c -libradsec_radius_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) +libradsec_radius_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -DHAVE_CONFIG_H DICTIONARIES = \ share/dictionary.txt \ diff --git a/lib/radius/attrs.c b/lib/radius/attrs.c index d096cc2..21cd3f0 100644 --- a/lib/radius/attrs.c +++ b/lib/radius/attrs.c @@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ static ssize_t data2vp_any(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, #endif -#ifdef FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET: +#ifdef FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET /* * Ascend-Send-Secret * Ascend-Receive-Secret diff --git a/lib/radius/client.h b/lib/radius/client.h index 6c1526d..aefb40d 100644 --- a/lib/radius/client.h +++ b/lib/radius/client.h @@ -35,21 +35,31 @@ SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. /* * System-specific header files. */ +#include #include #include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H #include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H #include +#endif #include +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H #include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H #include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include +#endif #include - -/* - * Definitions of attributes. - */ +#include #include /** \defgroup build Build Helpers diff --git a/lib/radius/custom.c b/lib/radius/custom.c index 02e2463..917939a 100644 --- a/lib/radius/custom.c +++ b/lib/radius/custom.c @@ -24,6 +24,38 @@ ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Kungliga Tekniska HAÎåÎÝgskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ /** \file custom.c * \brief Functions which should be customized for your local system. @@ -34,6 +66,49 @@ SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. #include #include +#ifdef WIN32 +#include + +volatile static HCRYPTPROV nr_cryptprovider = 0; + +static HCRYPTPROV +nr_CryptProvider(void) +{ + BOOL rv; + HCRYPTPROV cryptprovider = 0; + + if (nr_cryptprovider != 0) + return nr_cryptprovider; + + rv = CryptAcquireContext(&cryptprovider, NULL, + MS_ENHANCED_PROV, PROV_RSA_FULL, + 0); + + if (GetLastError() == NTE_BAD_KEYSET) { + if(!rv) + rv = CryptAcquireContext(&cryptprovider, NULL, + MS_ENHANCED_PROV, PROV_RSA_FULL, + CRYPT_NEWKEYSET); + } + + if (rv && + InterlockedCompareExchangePointer((PVOID *) &nr_cryptprovider, + (PVOID) cryptprovider, 0) != 0) { + + CryptReleaseContext(cryptprovider, 0); + cryptprovider = nr_cryptprovider; + } + + return cryptprovider; +} + +ssize_t nr_rand_bytes(uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) +{ + if (CryptGenRandom(nr_CryptProvider(), data_len, data)) + return 0; + return data_len; +} +#else ssize_t nr_rand_bytes(uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) { static int fd = -1; @@ -49,6 +124,7 @@ ssize_t nr_rand_bytes(uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) return read(fd, data, data_len); } +#endif /* WIN32 */ uint32_t nr_rand(void) { diff --git a/lib/radius/id.c b/lib/radius/id.c index 2b956f2..4ccd032 100644 --- a/lib/radius/id.c +++ b/lib/radius/id.c @@ -26,7 +26,10 @@ SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "client.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include +#endif /** \file id.c * \brief Handling of ID allocation / freeing @@ -141,7 +144,7 @@ int nr_server_close(const nr_server_t *s) if (s->used > 0) return -RSE_INUSE; - if (s->sockfd >= 0) close(s->sockfd); + if (s->sockfd >= 0) evutil_closesocket(s->sockfd); return 0; } diff --git a/lib/radius/packet.c b/lib/radius/packet.c deleted file mode 100644 index c5d3bc4..0000000 --- a/lib/radius/packet.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,916 +0,0 @@ -/* -Copyright (c) 2011, Network RADIUS SARL -All rights reserved. - -Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * Neither the name of the nor the - names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products - derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - -THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND -ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE -DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL BE LIABLE FOR ANY -DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES -(INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; -LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND -ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS -SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -/** \file packet.c - * \brief Encoding and decoding packets - */ - -#include "client.h" - -#if RS_MAX_PACKET_LEN < 64 -#error RS_MAX_PACKET_LEN is too small. It should be at least 64. -#endif - -#if RS_MAX_PACKET_LEN > 16384 -#error RS_MAX_PACKET_LEN is too large. It should be smaller than 16K. -#endif - -const char *nr_packet_codes[RS_MAX_PACKET_CODE + 1] = { - NULL, - "Access-Request", - "Access-Accept", - "Access-Reject", - "Accounting-Request", - "Accounting-Response", - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, - "Access-Challenge", - "Status-Server", /* 12 */ - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, /* 19 */ - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, /* 20..29 */ - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, /* 30..39 */ - "Disconnect-Request", - "Disconnect-ACK", - "Disconnect-NAK", - "CoA-Request", - "CoA-ACK", - "CoA-NAK" -}; - - -static uint64_t allowed_responses[RS_MAX_PACKET_CODE + 1] = { - 0, - (1 << PW_ACCESS_ACCEPT) | (1 << PW_ACCESS_REJECT) | (1 << PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE), - 0, 0, - 1 << PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE, - 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, - (1 << PW_ACCESS_ACCEPT) | (1 << PW_ACCESS_REJECT) | (1 << PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) | (1 << PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE), - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, /* 20..29 */ - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, /* 30..39 */ - (((uint64_t) 1) << PW_DISCONNECT_ACK) | (((uint64_t) 1) << PW_DISCONNECT_NAK), - 0, - 0, - (((uint64_t) 1) << PW_COA_ACK) | (((uint64_t) 1) << PW_COA_NAK), - 0, - 0 -}; - - -int nr_packet_ok_raw(const uint8_t *data, size_t sizeof_data) -{ - size_t packet_len; - const uint8_t *attr, *end; - - if (!data || (sizeof_data < 20)) { - nr_debug_error("Invalid argument"); - return -RSE_INVAL; - } - - packet_len = (data[2] << 8) | data[3]; - if (packet_len < 20) { - nr_debug_error("Packet length is too small"); - return -RSE_PACKET_TOO_SMALL; - } - - if (packet_len > sizeof_data) { - nr_debug_error("Packet length overflows received data"); - return -RSE_PACKET_TOO_LARGE; - } - - /* - * If we receive 100 bytes, and the header says it's 20 bytes, - * then it's 20 bytes. - */ - end = data + packet_len; - - for (attr = data + 20; attr < end; attr += attr[1]) { - if ((attr + 2) > end) { - nr_debug_error("Attribute overflows packet"); - return -RSE_ATTR_OVERFLOW; - } - - if (attr[1] < 2) { - nr_debug_error("Attribute length is too small"); - return -RSE_ATTR_TOO_SMALL; - } - - if ((attr + attr[1]) > end) { - nr_debug_error("Attribute length is too large"); - return -RSE_ATTR_TOO_LARGE; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -int nr_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet) -{ - int rcode; - - if (!packet) return -RSE_INVAL; - - if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_OK) != 0) return 0; - - rcode = nr_packet_ok_raw(packet->data, packet->length); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - - packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_OK; - return 0; -} - - -/* - * Comparison function that is time-independent. Using "memcmp" - * would satisfy the "comparison" part. However, it would also - * leak information about *which* bytes are wrong. Attackers - * could use that leak to create a "correct" RADIUS packet which - * will be accepted by the client and/or server. - */ -static int digest_cmp(const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t length) -{ - int result = 0; - size_t i; - - for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { - result |= (a[i] ^ b[i]); - } - - return result; -} - - -#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR -static int msg_auth_ok(const RADIUS_PACKET *original, - uint8_t *ma, - uint8_t *data, size_t length) -{ - uint8_t packet_vector[sizeof(original->vector)]; - uint8_t msg_auth_vector[sizeof(original->vector)]; - uint8_t calc_auth_vector[sizeof(original->vector)]; - - if (ma[1] != 18) { - nr_debug_error("Message-Authenticator has invalid length"); - return -RSE_MSG_AUTH_LEN; - } - - memcpy(packet_vector, data + 4, sizeof(packet_vector)); - memcpy(msg_auth_vector, ma + 2, sizeof(msg_auth_vector)); - memset(ma + 2, 0, sizeof(msg_auth_vector)); - - switch (data[0]) { - default: - break; - - case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST: - case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE: - case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST: - case PW_DISCONNECT_ACK: - case PW_DISCONNECT_NAK: - case PW_COA_REQUEST: - case PW_COA_ACK: - case PW_COA_NAK: - memset(data + 4, 0, sizeof(packet_vector)); - break; - - case PW_ACCESS_ACCEPT: - case PW_ACCESS_REJECT: - case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE: - if (!original) { - nr_debug_error("Cannot validate response without request"); - return -RSE_REQUEST_REQUIRED; - } - memcpy(data + 4, original->vector, sizeof(original->vector)); - break; - } - - nr_hmac_md5(data, length, - (const uint8_t *) original->secret, original->sizeof_secret, - calc_auth_vector); - - memcpy(ma + 2, msg_auth_vector, sizeof(msg_auth_vector)); - memcpy(data + 4, packet_vector, sizeof(packet_vector)); - - if (digest_cmp(calc_auth_vector, msg_auth_vector, - sizeof(calc_auth_vector)) != 0) { - nr_debug_error("Invalid Message-Authenticator"); - return -RSE_MSG_AUTH_WRONG; - } - - return 1; -} -#endif - -/* - * The caller ensures that the packet codes are as expected. - */ -static int packet_auth_ok(const RADIUS_PACKET *original, - uint8_t *data, size_t length) -{ - uint8_t packet_vector[sizeof(original->vector)]; - uint8_t calc_digest[sizeof(original->vector)]; - RS_MD5_CTX ctx; - - if ((data[0] == PW_ACCESS_REQUEST) || - (data[0] == PW_STATUS_SERVER)) return 1; - - memcpy(packet_vector, data + 4, sizeof(packet_vector)); - - if (!original) { - memset(data + 4, 0, sizeof(packet_vector)); - } else { - memcpy(data + 4, original->vector, sizeof(original->vector)); - } - - RS_MD5Init(&ctx); - RS_MD5Update(&ctx, data, length); - RS_MD5Update(&ctx, original->secret, original->sizeof_secret); - RS_MD5Final(calc_digest, &ctx); - - memcpy(data + 4, packet_vector, sizeof(packet_vector)); - - if (digest_cmp(calc_digest, packet_vector, - sizeof(packet_vector)) != 0) { - nr_debug_error("Invalid authentication vector"); - return -RSE_AUTH_VECTOR_WRONG; - } - - return 0; -} - - -int nr_packet_verify(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original) -{ - int rcode; - uint8_t *attr; -#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR - const uint8_t *end; -#endif - - if (!packet || !packet->data || !packet->secret) { - nr_debug_error("Invalid argument"); - return -RSE_INVAL; - } - - if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_VERIFIED) != 0) return 0; - - /* - * Packet isn't well formed. Ignore it. - */ - rcode = nr_packet_ok(packet); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - - /* - * Get rid of improper packets as early as possible. - */ - if (original) { - uint64_t mask; - - if (original->code > RS_MAX_PACKET_CODE) { - nr_debug_error("Invalid original code %u", - original->code); - return -RSE_INVALID_REQUEST_CODE; - } - - if (packet->data[1] != original->id) { - nr_debug_error("Ignoring response with wrong ID %u", - packet->data[1]); - return -RSE_INVALID_RESPONSE_CODE; - } - - mask = 1; - mask <<= packet->data[0]; - - if ((allowed_responses[original->code] & mask) == 0) { - nr_debug_error("Ignoring response with wrong code %u", - packet->data[0]); - return -RSE_INVALID_RESPONSE_CODE; - } - - if ((memcmp(&packet->src, &original->dst, sizeof(packet->src)) != 0) && - (evutil_sockaddr_cmp(&(packet->src), &(original->dst)) != 0)) { - nr_debug_error("Ignoring response from wrong IP/port"); - return -RSE_INVALID_RESPONSE_SRC; - } - - } else if (allowed_responses[packet->data[0]] != 0) { - nr_debug_error("Ignoring response without original"); - return -RSE_INVALID_RESPONSE_CODE; - } - -#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR - end = packet->data + packet->length; - - /* - * Note that the packet MUST be well-formed here. - */ - for (attr = packet->data + 20; attr < end; attr += attr[1]) { - if (attr[0] == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) { - rcode = msg_auth_ok(original, attr, - packet->data, packet->length); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - } - } -#endif - - /* - * Verify the packet authenticator. - */ - rcode = packet_auth_ok(original, packet->data, packet->length); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - - packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_VERIFIED; - - return 0; -} - - -int nr_packet_decode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original) -{ - int rcode, num_attributes; - uint8_t *data, *attr; - const uint8_t *end; - VALUE_PAIR **tail, *vp; - - if (!packet) return -RSE_INVAL; - - if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_DECODED) != 0) return 0; - - rcode = nr_packet_ok(packet); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - - data = packet->data; - end = data + packet->length; - tail = &packet->vps; - num_attributes = 0; - - /* - * Loop over the packet, converting attrs to VPs. - */ - for (attr = data + 20; attr < end; attr += attr[1]) { - rcode = nr_attr2vp(packet, original, - attr, end - attr, &vp); - if (rcode < 0) { - nr_vp_free(&packet->vps); - return -rcode; - } - - *tail = vp; - while (vp) { - num_attributes++; - tail = &(vp->next); - vp = vp->next; - } - - if (num_attributes > RS_MAX_ATTRIBUTES) { - nr_debug_error("Too many attributes"); - nr_vp_free(&packet->vps); - return -RSE_TOO_MANY_ATTRS; - } - } - - packet->code = data[0]; - packet->id = data[1]; - memcpy(packet->vector, data + 4, sizeof(packet->vector)); - - packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_DECODED; - - return 0; -} - - -int nr_packet_sign(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original) -{ -#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR - size_t ma = 0; - const uint8_t *attr, *end; -#endif - - if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_SIGNED) != 0) return 0; - - if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_ENCODED) == 0) { - int rcode; - - rcode = nr_packet_encode(packet, original); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - } - - if ((packet->code == PW_ACCESS_ACCEPT) || - (packet->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) || - (packet->code == PW_ACCESS_REJECT)) { -#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR - if (!original) { - nr_debug_error("Original packet is required to create the Message-Authenticator"); - return -RSE_REQUEST_REQUIRED; - } -#endif - - memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, - sizeof(original->vector)); - } else { - memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, - sizeof(packet->vector)); - } - -#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR - end = packet->data + packet->length; - - for (attr = packet->data + 20; attr < end; attr += attr[1]) { - if (attr[0] == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) { - ma = (attr - packet->data); - break; - } - } - - /* - * Force all Access-Request packets to have a - * Message-Authenticator. - */ - if (!ma && ((packet->length + 18) <= packet->sizeof_data) && - ((packet->code == PW_ACCESS_REQUEST) || - (packet->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER))) { - ma = packet->length; - - packet->data[ma]= PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR; - packet->data[ma + 1] = 18; - memset(&packet->data[ma + 2], 0, 16); - packet->length += 18; - } - - /* - * Reset the length. - */ - packet->data[2] = (packet->length >> 8) & 0xff; - packet->data[3] = packet->length & 0xff; - - /* - * Sign the Message-Authenticator && packet. - */ - if (ma) { - nr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->length, - (const uint8_t *) packet->secret, packet->sizeof_secret, - packet->data + ma + 2); - } -#endif - - /* - * Calculate the signature. - */ - if (!((packet->code == PW_ACCESS_REQUEST) || - (packet->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER))) { - RS_MD5_CTX ctx; - - RS_MD5Init(&ctx); - RS_MD5Update(&ctx, packet->data, packet->length); - RS_MD5Update(&ctx, packet->secret, packet->sizeof_secret); - RS_MD5Final(packet->vector, &ctx); - } - - memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, sizeof(packet->vector)); - - packet->attempts = 0; - packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_SIGNED; - - return 0; -} - - -static int can_encode_packet(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, - const RADIUS_PACKET *original) -{ - if ((packet->code == 0) || - (packet->code > RS_MAX_PACKET_CODE) || - (original && (original->code > RS_MAX_PACKET_CODE))) { - nr_debug_error("Cannot send unknown packet code"); - return -RSE_INVALID_REQUEST_CODE; - } - - if (!nr_packet_codes[packet->code]) { - nr_debug_error("Cannot handle packet code %u", - packet->code); - return -RSE_INVALID_REQUEST_CODE; - } - -#ifdef NR_NO_MALLOC - if (!packet->data) { - nr_debug_error("No place to put packet"); - return -RSE_NO_PACKET_DATA; - } -#endif - - if (packet->sizeof_data < 20) { - nr_debug_error("The buffer is too small to encode the packet"); - return -RSE_PACKET_TOO_SMALL; - } - - /* - * Enforce request / response correlation. - */ - if (original) { - uint64_t mask; - - mask = 1; - mask <<= packet->code; - - if ((allowed_responses[original->code] & mask) == 0) { - nr_debug_error("Cannot encode response %u to packet %u", - packet->code, original->code); - return -RSE_INVALID_RESPONSE_CODE; - } - packet->id = original->id; - - } else if (allowed_responses[packet->code] == 0) { - nr_debug_error("Cannot encode response %u without original", - packet->code); - return -RSE_REQUEST_REQUIRED; - } - - return 0; -} - -static void encode_header(RADIUS_PACKET *packet) -{ - if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_HEADER) != 0) return; - - memset(packet->data, 0, 20); - packet->data[0] = packet->code; - packet->data[1] = packet->id; - packet->data[2] = 0; - packet->data[3] = 20; - packet->length = 20; - - /* - * Calculate a random authentication vector. - */ - if ((packet->code == PW_ACCESS_REQUEST) || - (packet->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER)) { - nr_rand_bytes(packet->vector, sizeof(packet->vector)); - } else { - memset(packet->vector, 0, sizeof(packet->vector)); - } - - memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, sizeof(packet->vector)); - - packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_HEADER; -} - -int nr_packet_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original) -{ -#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR - size_t ma = 0; -#endif - int rcode; - ssize_t len; - const VALUE_PAIR *vp; - uint8_t *data, *end; - - if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_ENCODED) != 0) return 0; - - rcode = can_encode_packet(packet, original); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - - data = packet->data; - end = data + packet->sizeof_data; - - encode_header(packet); - data += 20; - - /* - * Encode each VALUE_PAIR - */ - vp = packet->vps; - while (vp) { -#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR - if (vp->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) { - ma = (data - packet->data); - } -#endif - len = nr_vp2attr(packet, original, &vp, - data, end - data); - if (len < 0) return len; - - if (len == 0) break; /* insufficient room to encode it */ - - data += data[1]; - } - -#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR - /* - * Always send a Message-Authenticator. - * - * We do *not* recommend removing this code. - */ - if (((packet->code == PW_ACCESS_REQUEST) || - (packet->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER)) && - !ma && - ((data + 18) <= end)) { - ma = (data - packet->data); - data[0] = PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR; - data[1] = 18; - memset(data + 2, 0, 16); - data += data[1]; - } -#endif - - packet->length = data - packet->data; - - packet->data[2] = (packet->length >> 8) & 0xff; - packet->data[3] = packet->length & 0xff; - - packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_ENCODED; - - return packet->length; -} - - -/* - * Ensure that the nr_data2attr_t structure is filled in - * appropriately. This includes filling in a fake DICT_ATTR - * structure, if necessary. - */ -static int do_callback(void *ctx, nr_packet_walk_func_t callback, - int attr, int vendor, - const uint8_t *data, size_t sizeof_data) - -{ - int rcode; - const DICT_ATTR *da; - DICT_ATTR myda; - char buffer[64]; - - da = nr_dict_attr_byvalue(attr, vendor); - - /* - * The attribute is supposed to have a particular length, - * but does not. It is therefore malformed. - */ - if (da && (da->flags.length != 0) && - da->flags.length != sizeof_data) { - da = NULL; - } - - if (!da) { - rcode = nr_dict_attr_2struct(&myda, attr, vendor, - buffer, sizeof(buffer)); - - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - da = &myda; - } - - rcode = callback(ctx, da, data, sizeof_data); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - - return 0; -} - - -int nr_packet_walk(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, void *ctx, - nr_packet_walk_func_t callback) -{ - int rcode; - uint8_t *attr; - const uint8_t *end; - - if (!packet || !callback) return -RSE_INVAL; - - rcode = nr_packet_ok(packet); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - - end = packet->data + packet->length; - - for (attr = packet->data + 20; attr < end; attr += attr[1]) { - int length, value; - int dv_type, dv_length; - uint32_t vendorpec; - const uint8_t *vsa; - const DICT_VENDOR *dv = NULL; - - vendorpec = 0; - value = attr[0]; - - if (value != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) { - raw: - rcode = do_callback(ctx, callback, - attr[0], 0, - attr + 2, attr[1] - 2); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - continue; - } - - if (attr[1] < 6) goto raw; - memcpy(&vendorpec, attr + 2, 4); - vendorpec = ntohl(vendorpec); - - if (dv && (dv->vendor != vendorpec)) dv = NULL; - - if (!dv) dv = nr_dict_vendor_byvalue(vendorpec); - - if (dv) { - dv_type = dv->type; - dv_length = dv->length; - } else { - dv_type = 1; - dv_length = 1; - } - - /* - * Malformed: it's a raw attribute. - */ - if (nr_tlv_ok(attr + 6, attr[1] - 6, dv_type, dv_length) < 0) { - goto raw; - } - - for (vsa = attr + 6; vsa < attr + attr[1]; vsa += length) { - switch (dv_type) { - case 4: - value = (vsa[2] << 8) | vsa[3]; - break; - - case 2: - value = (vsa[0] << 8) | vsa[1]; - break; - - case 1: - value = vsa[0]; - break; - - default: - return -RSE_INTERNAL; - } - - switch (dv_length) { - case 0: - length = attr[1] - 6 - dv_type; - break; - - case 2: - case 1: - length = vsa[dv_type + dv_length - 1]; - break; - - default: - return -RSE_INTERNAL; - } - - rcode = do_callback(ctx, callback, - value, vendorpec, - vsa + dv_type + dv_length, - length - dv_type - dv_length); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -int nr_packet_init(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original, - const char *secret, int code, - void *data, size_t sizeof_data) -{ - int rcode; - - if ((code < 0) || (code > RS_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) { - return -RSE_INVALID_REQUEST_CODE; - } - - if (!data || (sizeof_data < 20)) return -RSE_INVAL; - - memset(packet, 0, sizeof(*packet)); - packet->secret = secret; - packet->sizeof_secret = secret ? strlen(secret) : 0; - packet->code = code; - packet->id = 0; - packet->data = data; - packet->sizeof_data = sizeof_data; - - rcode = can_encode_packet(packet, original); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - - encode_header(packet); - - return 0; -} - - -static int pack_eap(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, - const void *data, size_t data_len) -{ - uint8_t *attr, *end; - const uint8_t *eap; - size_t left; - - eap = data; - left = data_len; - attr = packet->data + packet->length; - end = attr + packet->sizeof_data; - - while (left > 253) { - if ((attr + 255) > end) return -RSE_ATTR_OVERFLOW; - - attr[0] = PW_EAP_MESSAGE; - attr[1] = 255; - memcpy(attr + 2, eap, 253); - attr += attr[1]; - eap += 253; - left -= 253; - } - - if ((attr + (2 + left)) > end) return -RSE_ATTR_OVERFLOW; - - attr[0] = PW_EAP_MESSAGE; - attr[1] = 2 + left; - memcpy(attr + 2, eap, left); - attr += attr[1]; - packet->length = attr - packet->data; - - return 0; -} - -ssize_t nr_packet_attr_append(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, - const RADIUS_PACKET *original, - const DICT_ATTR *da, - const void *data, size_t data_len) -{ - ssize_t rcode; - uint8_t *attr, *end; - VALUE_PAIR my_vp; - const VALUE_PAIR *vp; - - if (!packet || !da || !data) { - return -RSE_INVAL; - } - - if (data_len == 0) { - if (da->type != RS_TYPE_STRING) return -RSE_ATTR_TOO_SMALL; - - data_len = strlen(data); - } - - packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_ENCODED; /* ignore any VPs */ - - attr = packet->data + packet->length; - end = attr + packet->sizeof_data; - - if ((attr + 2 + data_len) > end) { - return -RSE_ATTR_OVERFLOW; - } - - if ((da->flags.length != 0) && - (data_len != da->flags.length)) { - return -RSE_ATTR_VALUE_MALFORMED; - } - -#ifdef PW_EAP_MESSAGE - /* - * automatically split EAP-Message into multiple - * attributes. - */ - if (!da->vendor && (da->attr == PW_EAP_MESSAGE) && (data_len > 253)) { - return pack_eap(packet, data, data_len); - } -#endif - - if (data_len > 253) return -RSE_ATTR_TOO_LARGE; - - vp = nr_vp_init(&my_vp, da); - rcode = nr_vp_set_data(&my_vp, data, data_len); - if (rcode < 0) return rcode; - - /* - * Note that this function packs VSAs each into their own - * Vendor-Specific attribute. If this isn't what you - * want, use the version of the library with full support - * for TLVs, WiMAX, and extended attributes. - */ - rcode = nr_vp2attr(packet, original, &vp, attr, end - attr); - if (rcode <= 0) return rcode; - - packet->length += rcode; - - return rcode; -} diff --git a/lib/radius/parse.c b/lib/radius/parse.c index cd7491a..8446306 100644 --- a/lib/radius/parse.c +++ b/lib/radius/parse.c @@ -30,18 +30,25 @@ SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "client.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H #include +#endif ssize_t nr_vp_sscanf_value(VALUE_PAIR *vp, const char *value) { char *end; switch (vp->da->type) { - case RS_TYPE_STRING: - strlcpy(vp->vp_strvalue, value, sizeof(vp->vp_strvalue)); - vp->length = strlen(vp->vp_strvalue); - return vp->length; + case RS_TYPE_STRING: { + size_t len = strlen(value); + if (len >= RS_MAX_STRING_LEN) + return -RSE_ATTR_TOO_LARGE; + + memcpy(vp->vp_strvalue, value, len + 1); + return (vp->length = len); + } case RS_TYPE_DATE: case RS_TYPE_INTEGER: vp->vp_integer = strtoul(value, &end, 10); diff --git a/lib/radius/print.c b/lib/radius/print.c index 28dd0a6..6fa06d7 100644 --- a/lib/radius/print.c +++ b/lib/radius/print.c @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ size_t nr_vp_snprintf_value(char *buffer, size_t buflen, const VALUE_PAIR *vp) break; default: + len = 0; break; } diff --git a/lib/radius/radpkt.c b/lib/radius/radpkt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb8f75e --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/radius/radpkt.c @@ -0,0 +1,916 @@ +/* +Copyright (c) 2011, Network RADIUS SARL +All rights reserved. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * Neither the name of the nor the + names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products + derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND +ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE +DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL BE LIABLE FOR ANY +DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES +(INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; +LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND +ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/** \file packet.c + * \brief Encoding and decoding packets + */ + +#include "client.h" + +#if RS_MAX_PACKET_LEN < 64 +#error RS_MAX_PACKET_LEN is too small. It should be at least 64. +#endif + +#if RS_MAX_PACKET_LEN > 16384 +#error RS_MAX_PACKET_LEN is too large. It should be smaller than 16K. +#endif + +const char *nr_packet_codes[RS_MAX_PACKET_CODE + 1] = { + NULL, + "Access-Request", + "Access-Accept", + "Access-Reject", + "Accounting-Request", + "Accounting-Response", + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + "Access-Challenge", + "Status-Server", /* 12 */ + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, /* 19 */ + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, /* 20..29 */ + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, /* 30..39 */ + "Disconnect-Request", + "Disconnect-ACK", + "Disconnect-NAK", + "CoA-Request", + "CoA-ACK", + "CoA-NAK" +}; + + +static uint64_t allowed_responses[RS_MAX_PACKET_CODE + 1] = { + 0, + (1 << PW_ACCESS_ACCEPT) | (1 << PW_ACCESS_REJECT) | (1 << PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE), + 0, 0, + 1 << PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE, + 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, + (1 << PW_ACCESS_ACCEPT) | (1 << PW_ACCESS_REJECT) | (1 << PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) | (1 << PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE), + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, /* 20..29 */ + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, /* 30..39 */ + (((uint64_t) 1) << PW_DISCONNECT_ACK) | (((uint64_t) 1) << PW_DISCONNECT_NAK), + 0, + 0, + (((uint64_t) 1) << PW_COA_ACK) | (((uint64_t) 1) << PW_COA_NAK), + 0, + 0 +}; + + +int nr_packet_ok_raw(const uint8_t *data, size_t sizeof_data) +{ + size_t packet_len; + const uint8_t *attr, *end; + + if (!data || (sizeof_data < 20)) { + nr_debug_error("Invalid argument"); + return -RSE_INVAL; + } + + packet_len = (data[2] << 8) | data[3]; + if (packet_len < 20) { + nr_debug_error("Packet length is too small"); + return -RSE_PACKET_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (packet_len > sizeof_data) { + nr_debug_error("Packet length overflows received data"); + return -RSE_PACKET_TOO_LARGE; + } + + /* + * If we receive 100 bytes, and the header says it's 20 bytes, + * then it's 20 bytes. + */ + end = data + packet_len; + + for (attr = data + 20; attr < end; attr += attr[1]) { + if ((attr + 2) > end) { + nr_debug_error("Attribute overflows packet"); + return -RSE_ATTR_OVERFLOW; + } + + if (attr[1] < 2) { + nr_debug_error("Attribute length is too small"); + return -RSE_ATTR_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if ((attr + attr[1]) > end) { + nr_debug_error("Attribute length is too large"); + return -RSE_ATTR_TOO_LARGE; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int nr_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet) +{ + int rcode; + + if (!packet) return -RSE_INVAL; + + if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_OK) != 0) return 0; + + rcode = nr_packet_ok_raw(packet->data, packet->length); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + + packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_OK; + return 0; +} + + +/* + * Comparison function that is time-independent. Using "memcmp" + * would satisfy the "comparison" part. However, it would also + * leak information about *which* bytes are wrong. Attackers + * could use that leak to create a "correct" RADIUS packet which + * will be accepted by the client and/or server. + */ +static int digest_cmp(const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t length) +{ + int result = 0; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { + result |= (a[i] ^ b[i]); + } + + return result; +} + + +#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR +static int msg_auth_ok(const RADIUS_PACKET *original, + uint8_t *ma, + uint8_t *data, size_t length) +{ + uint8_t packet_vector[sizeof(original->vector)]; + uint8_t msg_auth_vector[sizeof(original->vector)]; + uint8_t calc_auth_vector[sizeof(original->vector)]; + + if (ma[1] != 18) { + nr_debug_error("Message-Authenticator has invalid length"); + return -RSE_MSG_AUTH_LEN; + } + + memcpy(packet_vector, data + 4, sizeof(packet_vector)); + memcpy(msg_auth_vector, ma + 2, sizeof(msg_auth_vector)); + memset(ma + 2, 0, sizeof(msg_auth_vector)); + + switch (data[0]) { + default: + break; + + case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST: + case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE: + case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST: + case PW_DISCONNECT_ACK: + case PW_DISCONNECT_NAK: + case PW_COA_REQUEST: + case PW_COA_ACK: + case PW_COA_NAK: + memset(data + 4, 0, sizeof(packet_vector)); + break; + + case PW_ACCESS_ACCEPT: + case PW_ACCESS_REJECT: + case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE: + if (!original) { + nr_debug_error("Cannot validate response without request"); + return -RSE_REQUEST_REQUIRED; + } + memcpy(data + 4, original->vector, sizeof(original->vector)); + break; + } + + nr_hmac_md5(data, length, + (const uint8_t *) original->secret, original->sizeof_secret, + calc_auth_vector); + + memcpy(ma + 2, msg_auth_vector, sizeof(msg_auth_vector)); + memcpy(data + 4, packet_vector, sizeof(packet_vector)); + + if (digest_cmp(calc_auth_vector, msg_auth_vector, + sizeof(calc_auth_vector)) != 0) { + nr_debug_error("Invalid Message-Authenticator"); + return -RSE_MSG_AUTH_WRONG; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif + +/* + * The caller ensures that the packet codes are as expected. + */ +static int packet_auth_ok(const RADIUS_PACKET *original, + uint8_t *data, size_t length) +{ + uint8_t packet_vector[sizeof(original->vector)]; + uint8_t calc_digest[sizeof(original->vector)]; + RS_MD5_CTX ctx; + + if ((data[0] == PW_ACCESS_REQUEST) || + (data[0] == PW_STATUS_SERVER)) return 1; + + memcpy(packet_vector, data + 4, sizeof(packet_vector)); + + if (!original) { + memset(data + 4, 0, sizeof(packet_vector)); + } else { + memcpy(data + 4, original->vector, sizeof(original->vector)); + } + + RS_MD5Init(&ctx); + RS_MD5Update(&ctx, data, length); + RS_MD5Update(&ctx, (const unsigned char *)original->secret, original->sizeof_secret); + RS_MD5Final(calc_digest, &ctx); + + memcpy(data + 4, packet_vector, sizeof(packet_vector)); + + if (digest_cmp(calc_digest, packet_vector, + sizeof(packet_vector)) != 0) { + nr_debug_error("Invalid authentication vector"); + return -RSE_AUTH_VECTOR_WRONG; + } + + return 0; +} + + +int nr_packet_verify(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original) +{ + int rcode; + uint8_t *attr; +#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR + const uint8_t *end; +#endif + + if (!packet || !packet->data || !packet->secret) { + nr_debug_error("Invalid argument"); + return -RSE_INVAL; + } + + if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_VERIFIED) != 0) return 0; + + /* + * Packet isn't well formed. Ignore it. + */ + rcode = nr_packet_ok(packet); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + + /* + * Get rid of improper packets as early as possible. + */ + if (original) { + uint64_t mask; + + if (original->code > RS_MAX_PACKET_CODE) { + nr_debug_error("Invalid original code %u", + original->code); + return -RSE_INVALID_REQUEST_CODE; + } + + if (packet->data[1] != original->id) { + nr_debug_error("Ignoring response with wrong ID %u", + packet->data[1]); + return -RSE_INVALID_RESPONSE_CODE; + } + + mask = 1; + mask <<= packet->data[0]; + + if ((allowed_responses[original->code] & mask) == 0) { + nr_debug_error("Ignoring response with wrong code %u", + packet->data[0]); + return -RSE_INVALID_RESPONSE_CODE; + } + + if ((memcmp(&packet->src, &original->dst, sizeof(packet->src)) != 0) && + (evutil_sockaddr_cmp((struct sockaddr *)&packet->src, (struct sockaddr *)&original->dst, 1) != 0)) { + nr_debug_error("Ignoring response from wrong IP/port"); + return -RSE_INVALID_RESPONSE_SRC; + } + + } else if (allowed_responses[packet->data[0]] != 0) { + nr_debug_error("Ignoring response without original"); + return -RSE_INVALID_RESPONSE_CODE; + } + +#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR + end = packet->data + packet->length; + + /* + * Note that the packet MUST be well-formed here. + */ + for (attr = packet->data + 20; attr < end; attr += attr[1]) { + if (attr[0] == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) { + rcode = msg_auth_ok(original, attr, + packet->data, packet->length); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Verify the packet authenticator. + */ + rcode = packet_auth_ok(original, packet->data, packet->length); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + + packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_VERIFIED; + + return 0; +} + + +int nr_packet_decode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original) +{ + int rcode, num_attributes; + uint8_t *data, *attr; + const uint8_t *end; + VALUE_PAIR **tail, *vp; + + if (!packet) return -RSE_INVAL; + + if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_DECODED) != 0) return 0; + + rcode = nr_packet_ok(packet); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + + data = packet->data; + end = data + packet->length; + tail = &packet->vps; + num_attributes = 0; + + /* + * Loop over the packet, converting attrs to VPs. + */ + for (attr = data + 20; attr < end; attr += attr[1]) { + rcode = nr_attr2vp(packet, original, + attr, end - attr, &vp); + if (rcode < 0) { + nr_vp_free(&packet->vps); + return -rcode; + } + + *tail = vp; + while (vp) { + num_attributes++; + tail = &(vp->next); + vp = vp->next; + } + + if (num_attributes > RS_MAX_ATTRIBUTES) { + nr_debug_error("Too many attributes"); + nr_vp_free(&packet->vps); + return -RSE_TOO_MANY_ATTRS; + } + } + + packet->code = data[0]; + packet->id = data[1]; + memcpy(packet->vector, data + 4, sizeof(packet->vector)); + + packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_DECODED; + + return 0; +} + + +int nr_packet_sign(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original) +{ +#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR + size_t ma = 0; + const uint8_t *attr, *end; +#endif + + if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_SIGNED) != 0) return 0; + + if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_ENCODED) == 0) { + int rcode; + + rcode = nr_packet_encode(packet, original); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + } + + if ((packet->code == PW_ACCESS_ACCEPT) || + (packet->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) || + (packet->code == PW_ACCESS_REJECT)) { +#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR + if (!original) { + nr_debug_error("Original packet is required to create the Message-Authenticator"); + return -RSE_REQUEST_REQUIRED; + } +#endif + + memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, + sizeof(original->vector)); + } else { + memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, + sizeof(packet->vector)); + } + +#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR + end = packet->data + packet->length; + + for (attr = packet->data + 20; attr < end; attr += attr[1]) { + if (attr[0] == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) { + ma = (attr - packet->data); + break; + } + } + + /* + * Force all Access-Request packets to have a + * Message-Authenticator. + */ + if (!ma && ((packet->length + 18) <= packet->sizeof_data) && + ((packet->code == PW_ACCESS_REQUEST) || + (packet->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER))) { + ma = packet->length; + + packet->data[ma]= PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR; + packet->data[ma + 1] = 18; + memset(&packet->data[ma + 2], 0, 16); + packet->length += 18; + } + + /* + * Reset the length. + */ + packet->data[2] = (packet->length >> 8) & 0xff; + packet->data[3] = packet->length & 0xff; + + /* + * Sign the Message-Authenticator && packet. + */ + if (ma) { + nr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->length, + (const uint8_t *) packet->secret, packet->sizeof_secret, + packet->data + ma + 2); + } +#endif + + /* + * Calculate the signature. + */ + if (!((packet->code == PW_ACCESS_REQUEST) || + (packet->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER))) { + RS_MD5_CTX ctx; + + RS_MD5Init(&ctx); + RS_MD5Update(&ctx, packet->data, packet->length); + RS_MD5Update(&ctx, (const unsigned char *)packet->secret, packet->sizeof_secret); + RS_MD5Final(packet->vector, &ctx); + } + + memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, sizeof(packet->vector)); + + packet->attempts = 0; + packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_SIGNED; + + return 0; +} + + +static int can_encode_packet(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, + const RADIUS_PACKET *original) +{ + if ((packet->code == 0) || + (packet->code > RS_MAX_PACKET_CODE) || + (original && (original->code > RS_MAX_PACKET_CODE))) { + nr_debug_error("Cannot send unknown packet code"); + return -RSE_INVALID_REQUEST_CODE; + } + + if (!nr_packet_codes[packet->code]) { + nr_debug_error("Cannot handle packet code %u", + packet->code); + return -RSE_INVALID_REQUEST_CODE; + } + +#ifdef NR_NO_MALLOC + if (!packet->data) { + nr_debug_error("No place to put packet"); + return -RSE_NO_PACKET_DATA; + } +#endif + + if (packet->sizeof_data < 20) { + nr_debug_error("The buffer is too small to encode the packet"); + return -RSE_PACKET_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* + * Enforce request / response correlation. + */ + if (original) { + uint64_t mask; + + mask = 1; + mask <<= packet->code; + + if ((allowed_responses[original->code] & mask) == 0) { + nr_debug_error("Cannot encode response %u to packet %u", + packet->code, original->code); + return -RSE_INVALID_RESPONSE_CODE; + } + packet->id = original->id; + + } else if (allowed_responses[packet->code] == 0) { + nr_debug_error("Cannot encode response %u without original", + packet->code); + return -RSE_REQUEST_REQUIRED; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void encode_header(RADIUS_PACKET *packet) +{ + if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_HEADER) != 0) return; + + memset(packet->data, 0, 20); + packet->data[0] = packet->code; + packet->data[1] = packet->id; + packet->data[2] = 0; + packet->data[3] = 20; + packet->length = 20; + + /* + * Calculate a random authentication vector. + */ + if ((packet->code == PW_ACCESS_REQUEST) || + (packet->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER)) { + nr_rand_bytes(packet->vector, sizeof(packet->vector)); + } else { + memset(packet->vector, 0, sizeof(packet->vector)); + } + + memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, sizeof(packet->vector)); + + packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_HEADER; +} + +int nr_packet_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original) +{ +#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR + size_t ma = 0; +#endif + int rcode; + ssize_t len; + const VALUE_PAIR *vp; + uint8_t *data, *end; + + if ((packet->flags & RS_PACKET_ENCODED) != 0) return 0; + + rcode = can_encode_packet(packet, original); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + + data = packet->data; + end = data + packet->sizeof_data; + + encode_header(packet); + data += 20; + + /* + * Encode each VALUE_PAIR + */ + vp = packet->vps; + while (vp) { +#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR + if (vp->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) { + ma = (data - packet->data); + } +#endif + len = nr_vp2attr(packet, original, &vp, + data, end - data); + if (len < 0) return len; + + if (len == 0) break; /* insufficient room to encode it */ + + data += data[1]; + } + +#ifdef PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR + /* + * Always send a Message-Authenticator. + * + * We do *not* recommend removing this code. + */ + if (((packet->code == PW_ACCESS_REQUEST) || + (packet->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER)) && + !ma && + ((data + 18) <= end)) { + ma = (data - packet->data); + data[0] = PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR; + data[1] = 18; + memset(data + 2, 0, 16); + data += data[1]; + } +#endif + + packet->length = data - packet->data; + + packet->data[2] = (packet->length >> 8) & 0xff; + packet->data[3] = packet->length & 0xff; + + packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_ENCODED; + + return packet->length; +} + + +/* + * Ensure that the nr_data2attr_t structure is filled in + * appropriately. This includes filling in a fake DICT_ATTR + * structure, if necessary. + */ +static int do_callback(void *ctx, nr_packet_walk_func_t callback, + int attr, int vendor, + const uint8_t *data, size_t sizeof_data) + +{ + int rcode; + const DICT_ATTR *da; + DICT_ATTR myda; + char buffer[64]; + + da = nr_dict_attr_byvalue(attr, vendor); + + /* + * The attribute is supposed to have a particular length, + * but does not. It is therefore malformed. + */ + if (da && (da->flags.length != 0) && + da->flags.length != sizeof_data) { + da = NULL; + } + + if (!da) { + rcode = nr_dict_attr_2struct(&myda, attr, vendor, + buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + da = &myda; + } + + rcode = callback(ctx, da, data, sizeof_data); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + + return 0; +} + + +int nr_packet_walk(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, void *ctx, + nr_packet_walk_func_t callback) +{ + int rcode; + uint8_t *attr; + const uint8_t *end; + + if (!packet || !callback) return -RSE_INVAL; + + rcode = nr_packet_ok(packet); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + + end = packet->data + packet->length; + + for (attr = packet->data + 20; attr < end; attr += attr[1]) { + int length, value; + int dv_type, dv_length; + uint32_t vendorpec; + const uint8_t *vsa; + const DICT_VENDOR *dv = NULL; + + vendorpec = 0; + value = attr[0]; + + if (value != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) { + raw: + rcode = do_callback(ctx, callback, + attr[0], 0, + attr + 2, attr[1] - 2); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + continue; + } + + if (attr[1] < 6) goto raw; + memcpy(&vendorpec, attr + 2, 4); + vendorpec = ntohl(vendorpec); + + if (dv && (dv->vendor != vendorpec)) dv = NULL; + + if (!dv) dv = nr_dict_vendor_byvalue(vendorpec); + + if (dv) { + dv_type = dv->type; + dv_length = dv->length; + } else { + dv_type = 1; + dv_length = 1; + } + + /* + * Malformed: it's a raw attribute. + */ + if (nr_tlv_ok(attr + 6, attr[1] - 6, dv_type, dv_length) < 0) { + goto raw; + } + + for (vsa = attr + 6; vsa < attr + attr[1]; vsa += length) { + switch (dv_type) { + case 4: + value = (vsa[2] << 8) | vsa[3]; + break; + + case 2: + value = (vsa[0] << 8) | vsa[1]; + break; + + case 1: + value = vsa[0]; + break; + + default: + return -RSE_INTERNAL; + } + + switch (dv_length) { + case 0: + length = attr[1] - 6 - dv_type; + break; + + case 2: + case 1: + length = vsa[dv_type + dv_length - 1]; + break; + + default: + return -RSE_INTERNAL; + } + + rcode = do_callback(ctx, callback, + value, vendorpec, + vsa + dv_type + dv_length, + length - dv_type - dv_length); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int nr_packet_init(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original, + const char *secret, int code, + void *data, size_t sizeof_data) +{ + int rcode; + + if ((code < 0) || (code > RS_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) { + return -RSE_INVALID_REQUEST_CODE; + } + + if (!data || (sizeof_data < 20)) return -RSE_INVAL; + + memset(packet, 0, sizeof(*packet)); + packet->secret = secret; + packet->sizeof_secret = secret ? strlen(secret) : 0; + packet->code = code; + packet->id = 0; + packet->data = data; + packet->sizeof_data = sizeof_data; + + rcode = can_encode_packet(packet, original); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + + encode_header(packet); + + return 0; +} + + +static int pack_eap(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, + const void *data, size_t data_len) +{ + uint8_t *attr, *end; + const uint8_t *eap; + size_t left; + + eap = data; + left = data_len; + attr = packet->data + packet->length; + end = attr + packet->sizeof_data; + + while (left > 253) { + if ((attr + 255) > end) return -RSE_ATTR_OVERFLOW; + + attr[0] = PW_EAP_MESSAGE; + attr[1] = 255; + memcpy(attr + 2, eap, 253); + attr += attr[1]; + eap += 253; + left -= 253; + } + + if ((attr + (2 + left)) > end) return -RSE_ATTR_OVERFLOW; + + attr[0] = PW_EAP_MESSAGE; + attr[1] = 2 + left; + memcpy(attr + 2, eap, left); + attr += attr[1]; + packet->length = attr - packet->data; + + return 0; +} + +ssize_t nr_packet_attr_append(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, + const RADIUS_PACKET *original, + const DICT_ATTR *da, + const void *data, size_t data_len) +{ + ssize_t rcode; + uint8_t *attr, *end; + VALUE_PAIR my_vp; + const VALUE_PAIR *vp; + + if (!packet || !da || !data) { + return -RSE_INVAL; + } + + if (data_len == 0) { + if (da->type != RS_TYPE_STRING) return -RSE_ATTR_TOO_SMALL; + + data_len = strlen(data); + } + + packet->flags |= RS_PACKET_ENCODED; /* ignore any VPs */ + + attr = packet->data + packet->length; + end = attr + packet->sizeof_data; + + if ((attr + 2 + data_len) > end) { + return -RSE_ATTR_OVERFLOW; + } + + if ((da->flags.length != 0) && + (data_len != da->flags.length)) { + return -RSE_ATTR_VALUE_MALFORMED; + } + +#ifdef PW_EAP_MESSAGE + /* + * automatically split EAP-Message into multiple + * attributes. + */ + if (!da->vendor && (da->attr == PW_EAP_MESSAGE) && (data_len > 253)) { + return pack_eap(packet, data, data_len); + } +#endif + + if (data_len > 253) return -RSE_ATTR_TOO_LARGE; + + vp = nr_vp_init(&my_vp, da); + rcode = nr_vp_set_data(&my_vp, data, data_len); + if (rcode < 0) return rcode; + + /* + * Note that this function packs VSAs each into their own + * Vendor-Specific attribute. If this isn't what you + * want, use the version of the library with full support + * for TLVs, WiMAX, and extended attributes. + */ + rcode = nr_vp2attr(packet, original, &vp, attr, end - attr); + if (rcode <= 0) return rcode; + + packet->length += rcode; + + return rcode; +} diff --git a/lib/radius/valuepair.c b/lib/radius/valuepair.c index b374fdd..6277f7d 100644 --- a/lib/radius/valuepair.c +++ b/lib/radius/valuepair.c @@ -35,17 +35,13 @@ void nr_vp_free(VALUE_PAIR **head) { VALUE_PAIR *next, *vp; - if (!head || !*head) return; - - vp = *head; - do { - if (vp) next = vp->next; + for (vp = *head; vp != NULL; vp = next) { + next = vp->next; if (vp->da->flags.encrypt) { memset(vp, 0, sizeof(vp)); } free(vp); - vp = next; - } while (next); + } *head = NULL; } -- cgit v1.1