diff options
author | venaas <venaas> | 2008-09-11 10:38:51 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | venaas <venaas@e88ac4ed-0b26-0410-9574-a7f39faa03bf> | 2008-09-11 10:38:51 +0000 |
commit | faf8717dcbc9c2e3ed1892402133b6c9663a5e7d (patch) | |
tree | 3085f5bd29b9c68d8ae94892b91d78586cd89a95 /radmsg.c | |
parent | a98c9b737c943e062efa1a4fc7b31d539e1a2f11 (diff) |
lots of changes to radsrv/reply and use of new radmsg stuff
git-svn-id: https://svn.testnett.uninett.no/radsecproxy/trunk@373 e88ac4ed-0b26-0410-9574-a7f39faa03bf
Diffstat (limited to 'radmsg.c')
-rw-r--r-- | radmsg.c | 238 |
1 files changed, 238 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/radmsg.c b/radmsg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26f8fbe --- /dev/null +++ b/radmsg.c @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Stig Venaas <venaas@uninett.no> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + */ + +#include <stdint.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <arpa/inet.h> +#include "list.h" +#include "tlv11.h" +#include "radmsg.h" +#include "debug.h" +#include <pthread.h> +#include <openssl/hmac.h> + +#define RADLEN(x) ntohs(((uint16_t *)(x))[1]) + +void radmsg_free(struct radmsg *msg) { + if (msg) { + freetlvlist(msg->attrs); + free(msg); + } +} + +struct radmsg *radmsg_init(uint8_t code, uint8_t id, uint8_t *auth) { + struct radmsg *msg; + + msg = malloc(sizeof(struct radmsg)); + if (!msg) + return NULL; + msg->attrs = list_create(); + if (!msg->attrs) { + free(msg); + return NULL; + } + msg->code = code; + msg->id = id; + memcpy(msg->auth, auth, 16); + return msg; +} + +int radmsg_add(struct radmsg *msg, struct tlv *attr) { + if (!msg || !msg->attrs) + return 1; + if (!attr) + return 0; + return list_push(msg->attrs, attr); +} + +/* returns first tlv of the given type */ +struct tlv *radmsg_gettype(struct radmsg *msg, uint8_t type) { + struct list_node *node; + struct tlv *tlv; + + if (!msg) + return NULL; + for (node = list_first(msg->attrs); node; node = list_next(node)) { + tlv = (struct tlv *)node->data; + if (tlv->t == type) + return tlv; + } + return NULL; +} + +uint8_t *radmsg2buf(struct radmsg *msg) { + struct list_node *node; + struct tlv *tlv; + int size; + uint8_t *buf, *p; + + if (!msg || !msg->attrs) + return NULL; + size = 20; + for (node = list_first(msg->attrs); node; node = list_next(node)) + size += 2 + ((struct tlv *)node->data)->l; + if (size > 65535) + return NULL; + buf = malloc(size); + if (!buf) + return NULL; + + p = buf; + *p++ = msg->code; + *p++ = msg->id; + *(uint16_t *)p = htons(size); + p += 2; + memcpy(p, msg->auth, 16); + p += 16; + + for (node = list_first(msg->attrs); node; node = list_next(node)) { + tlv = (struct tlv *)node->data; + p = tlv2buf(p, tlv); + p[-1] += 2; + p += tlv->l; + } + return buf; +} + +int _checkmsgauth(unsigned char *rad, uint8_t *authattr, uint8_t *secret) { + static pthread_mutex_t lock = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER; + static unsigned char first = 1; + static HMAC_CTX hmacctx; + unsigned int md_len; + uint8_t auth[16], hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + + pthread_mutex_lock(&lock); + if (first) { + HMAC_CTX_init(&hmacctx); + first = 0; + } + + memcpy(auth, authattr, 16); + memset(authattr, 0, 16); + md_len = 0; + HMAC_Init_ex(&hmacctx, secret, strlen((char *)secret), EVP_md5(), NULL); + HMAC_Update(&hmacctx, rad, RADLEN(rad)); + HMAC_Final(&hmacctx, hash, &md_len); + memcpy(authattr, auth, 16); + if (md_len != 16) { + debug(DBG_WARN, "message auth computation failed"); + pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock); + return 0; + } + + if (memcmp(auth, hash, 16)) { + debug(DBG_WARN, "message authenticator, wrong value"); + pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock); + return 0; + } + + pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock); + return 1; +} + +int _validauth(unsigned char *rad, unsigned char *reqauth, unsigned char *sec) { + static pthread_mutex_t lock = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER; + static unsigned char first = 1; + static EVP_MD_CTX mdctx; + unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned int len; + int result; + + pthread_mutex_lock(&lock); + if (first) { + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mdctx); + first = 0; + } + + len = RADLEN(rad); + + result = (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mdctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) && + EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, rad, 4) && + EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, reqauth, 16) && + (len <= 20 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, rad + 20, len - 20)) && + EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, sec, strlen((char *)sec)) && + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mdctx, hash, &len) && + len == 16 && + !memcmp(hash, rad + 4, 16)); + pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock); + return result; +} + +/* if secret set we also validate message authenticator if present */ +struct radmsg *buf2radmsg(uint8_t *buf, uint8_t *secret, uint8_t *rqauth) { + struct radmsg *msg; + uint8_t t, l, *v, *p, auth[16]; + uint16_t len; + struct tlv *attr; + + len = RADLEN(buf); + if (len < 20) + return NULL; + + if (secret && buf[0] == RAD_Accounting_Request) { + memset(auth, 0, 16); + if (!_validauth(buf, auth, secret)) { + debug(DBG_WARN, "buf2radmsg: Accounting-Request message authentication failed"); + return NULL; + } + } + + if (rqauth && !_validauth(buf, rqauth, secret)) { + debug(DBG_WARN, "buf2radmsg: Invalid auth, ignoring reply"); + return NULL; + } + + msg = radmsg_init(buf[0], buf[1], (uint8_t *)buf + 4); + if (!msg) + return NULL; + + p = buf + 20; + while (p - buf + 2 <= len) { + t = *p++; + l = *p++; + if (l < 2) { + debug(DBG_WARN, "buf2radmsg: invalid attribute length %d", l); + radmsg_free(msg); + return NULL; + } + l -= 2; + if (l) { + if (p - buf + l > len) { + debug(DBG_WARN, "buf2radmsg: attribute length %d exceeds packet length", l + 2); + radmsg_free(msg); + return NULL; + } + v = p; + p += l; + } + + if (t == RAD_Attr_Message_Authenticator && secret) { + if (rqauth) + memcpy(buf + 4, rqauth, 16); + if (l != 16 || !_checkmsgauth(buf, v, secret)) { + debug(DBG_WARN, "buf2radmsg: message authentication failed"); + if (rqauth) + memcpy(buf + 4, msg->auth, 16); + radmsg_free(msg); + return NULL; + } + if (rqauth) + memcpy(buf + 4, msg->auth, 16); + debug(DBG_DBG, "buf2radmsg: message auth ok"); + } + + attr = maketlv(t, l, v); + if (!attr || !radmsg_add(msg, attr)) { + freetlv(attr); + radmsg_free(msg); + return NULL; + } + } + return msg; +} |