/* * Copyright (c) 2013, Red Hat Inc. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the * following disclaimer. * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the * above copyright notice, this list of conditions and * the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or * other materials provided with the distribution. * * The names of contributors to this software may not be * used to endorse or promote products derived from this * software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE * COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS * OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED * AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, * OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF * THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH * DAMAGE. * * Author: Stef Walter */ #include "config.h" #include "asn1.h" #include "attrs.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "compat.h" #include "debug.h" #include "dict.h" #include "digest.h" #include "extract.h" #include "message.h" #include "oid.h" #include "path.h" #include "pem.h" #include "pkcs11.h" #include "pkcs11x.h" #include "save.h" #include "utf8.h" #include "x509.h" #include #include #include #include /* These functions are declared with a global scope for testing */ void p11_openssl_canon_string (char *str, size_t *len); bool p11_openssl_canon_string_der (p11_buffer *der); bool p11_openssl_canon_name_der (p11_dict *asn1_defs, p11_buffer *der); static p11_array * empty_usages (void) { return p11_array_new (free); } static bool known_usages (p11_array *oids) { char *string; int i; static const char *const strings[] = { P11_OID_SERVER_AUTH_STR, P11_OID_CLIENT_AUTH_STR, P11_OID_CODE_SIGNING_STR, P11_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION_STR, P11_OID_IPSEC_END_SYSTEM_STR, P11_OID_IPSEC_TUNNEL_STR, P11_OID_IPSEC_USER_STR, P11_OID_TIME_STAMPING_STR, NULL, }; for (i = 0; strings[i] != NULL; i++) { string = strdup (strings[i]); return_val_if_fail (string != NULL, false); if (!p11_array_push (oids, string)) return_val_if_reached (false); } return true; } static bool load_usage_ext (p11_enumerate *ex, const unsigned char *ext_oid, p11_array **oids) { unsigned char *value; node_asn *ext = NULL; size_t length; if (ex->attached) ext = p11_dict_get (ex->attached, ext_oid); if (ext == NULL) { *oids = NULL; return true; } value = p11_asn1_read (ext, "extnValue", &length); return_val_if_fail (value != NULL, false); *oids = p11_x509_parse_extended_key_usage (ex->asn1_defs, value, length); return_val_if_fail (*oids != NULL, false); free (value); return true; } static bool write_usages (node_asn *asn, const char *field, p11_array *oids) { char *last; int ret; int i; /* * No oids? Then doing this will make the entire optional * field go away */ if (oids == NULL) { ret = asn1_write_value (asn, field, NULL, 0); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, false); } else { if (asprintf (&last, "%s.?LAST", field) < 0) return_val_if_reached (false); for (i = 0; i < oids->num; i++) { ret = asn1_write_value (asn, field, "NEW", 1); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, false); ret = asn1_write_value (asn, last, oids->elem[i], -1); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, false); } free (last); } return true; } static bool write_trust_and_rejects (p11_enumerate *ex, node_asn *asn) { p11_array *trusts = NULL; p11_array *rejects = NULL; CK_BBOOL trust; CK_BBOOL distrust; if (!p11_attrs_find_bool (ex->attrs, CKA_TRUSTED, &trust)) trust = CK_FALSE; if (!p11_attrs_find_bool (ex->attrs, CKA_X_DISTRUSTED, &distrust)) distrust = CK_FALSE; if (!load_usage_ext (ex, P11_OID_OPENSSL_REJECT, &rejects)) return_val_if_reached (false); if (distrust) { /* * If this is on the blacklist then, make sure we have * an empty trusts field and add as many things to rejects * as possible. */ trusts = NULL; if (!rejects) rejects = empty_usages (); if (!known_usages (rejects)) return_val_if_reached (false); return_val_if_fail (rejects != NULL, false); } else if (trust) { /* * If this is an anchor, then try and guarantee that there * are some trust anchors. */ if (!load_usage_ext (ex, P11_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, &trusts)) return_val_if_reached (false); } else { /* * This is not an anchor, always put an empty trusts * section, with possible rejects, loaded above */ trusts = empty_usages (); } if (!write_usages (asn, "trust", trusts) || !write_usages (asn, "reject", rejects)) return_val_if_reached (false); p11_array_free (trusts); p11_array_free (rejects); return true; } static bool write_keyid (p11_enumerate *ex, node_asn *asn) { unsigned char *value = NULL; node_asn *ext = NULL; size_t length = 0; int ret; if (ex->attached) ext = p11_dict_get (ex->attached, P11_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER); if (ext != NULL) { value = p11_asn1_read (ext, "extnValue", &length); return_val_if_fail (value != NULL, false); } ret = asn1_write_value (asn, "keyid", value, length); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, false); free (value); return true; } static bool write_alias (p11_enumerate *ex, node_asn *asn) { CK_ATTRIBUTE *label; int ret; label = p11_attrs_find_valid (ex->attrs, CKA_LABEL); if (label == NULL) { ret = asn1_write_value (asn, "alias", NULL, 0); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, false); } else { ret = asn1_write_value (asn, "alias", label->pValue, label->ulValueLen); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, false); } return true; } static bool write_other (p11_enumerate *ex, node_asn *asn) { int ret; ret = asn1_write_value (asn, "other", NULL, 0); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, false); return true; } static bool prepare_pem_contents (p11_enumerate *ex, p11_buffer *buffer) { char message[ASN1_MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_SIZE]; unsigned char *der; node_asn *asn; size_t offset; int ret; int len; p11_buffer_add (buffer, ex->cert_der, ex->cert_len); asn = p11_asn1_create (ex->asn1_defs, "OPENSSL.CertAux"); return_val_if_fail (asn != NULL, false); if (!write_trust_and_rejects (ex, asn) || !write_alias (ex, asn) || !write_keyid (ex, asn) || !write_other (ex, asn)) return_val_if_reached (false); len = 0; offset = buffer->len; ret = asn1_der_coding (asn, "", NULL, &len, message); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_MEM_ERROR, false); der = p11_buffer_append (buffer, len); return_val_if_fail (der != NULL, false); ret = asn1_der_coding (asn, "", der, &len, message); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, false); buffer->len = offset + len; asn1_delete_structure (&asn); return true; } bool p11_extract_openssl_bundle (p11_enumerate *ex, const char *destination) { p11_save_file *file; p11_buffer output; p11_buffer buf; char *comment; bool ret = true; bool first; CK_RV rv; file = p11_save_open_file (destination, NULL, ex->flags); if (!file) return false; first = true; p11_buffer_init (&output, 0); while ((rv = p11_kit_iter_next (ex->iter)) == CKR_OK) { p11_buffer_init (&buf, 1024); if (!p11_buffer_reset (&output, 2048)) return_val_if_reached (false); if (prepare_pem_contents (ex, &buf)) { if (!p11_pem_write (buf.data, buf.len, "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE", &output)) return_val_if_reached (false); comment = p11_enumerate_comment (ex, first); first = false; ret = p11_save_write (file, comment, -1) && p11_save_write (file, output.data, output.len); free (comment); } p11_buffer_uninit (&buf); if (!ret) break; } p11_buffer_uninit (&output); if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_CANCEL) { p11_message ("failed to find certificates: %s", p11_kit_strerror (rv)); ret = false; } /* * This will produce an empty file (which is a valid PEM bundle) if no * certificates were found. */ if (!p11_save_finish_file (file, NULL, ret)) ret = false; return ret; } void p11_openssl_canon_string (char *str, size_t *len) { bool nsp; bool sp; char *in; char *out; char *end; /* * Now that the string is UTF-8 here we convert the string to the * OpenSSL canonical form. This is a bit odd and openssl specific. * Basically they ignore any char over 127, do ascii tolower() stuff * and collapse spaces based on isspace(). */ for (in = out = str, end = out + *len, sp = false, nsp = false; in < end; in++) { if (*in & 0x80 || !isspace (*in)) { /* If there has been a space, then add one */ if (sp) *out++ = ' '; *out++ = (*in & 0x80) ? *in : tolower (*in); sp = false; nsp = true; /* If there has been a non-space, then note we should get one */ } else if (nsp) { nsp = false; sp = true; } } if (out < end) out[0] = 0; *len = out - str; } bool p11_openssl_canon_string_der (p11_buffer *der) { char *string; size_t length; int output_len; int len_len; bool unknown_string; unsigned char *output; int len; string = p11_x509_parse_directory_string (der->data, der->len, &unknown_string, &length); /* Just pass through all the non-string types */ if (string == NULL) return unknown_string; p11_openssl_canon_string (string, &length); asn1_length_der (length, NULL, &len_len); output_len = 1 + len_len + length; if (!p11_buffer_reset (der, output_len)) return_val_if_reached (false); output = der->data; der->len = output_len; output[0] = 12; /* UTF8String */ len = output_len - 1; asn1_octet_der ((unsigned char *)string, length, output + 1, &len); assert (len == output_len - 1); free (string); return true; } bool p11_openssl_canon_name_der (p11_dict *asn1_defs, p11_buffer *der) { p11_buffer value; char outer[64]; char field[64]; node_asn *name; void *at; int value_len; bool failed; size_t offset; int ret; int num; int len; int i, j; name = p11_asn1_decode (asn1_defs, "PKIX1.Name", der->data, der->len, NULL); return_val_if_fail (name != NULL, false); ret = asn1_number_of_elements (name, "rdnSequence", &num); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, false); p11_buffer_init (&value, 0); p11_buffer_reset (der, 0); for (i = 1, failed = false; !failed && i < num + 1; i++) { snprintf (outer, sizeof (outer), "rdnSequence.?%d", i); for (j = 1; !failed; j++) { snprintf (field, sizeof (field), "%s.?%d.value", outer, j); value_len = 0; ret = asn1_read_value (name, field, NULL, &value_len); if (ret == ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND) break; return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_MEM_ERROR, false); if (!p11_buffer_reset (&value, value_len)) return_val_if_reached (false); ret = asn1_read_value (name, field, value.data, &value_len); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, false); value.len = value_len; if (p11_openssl_canon_string_der (&value)) { ret = asn1_write_value (name, field, value.data, value.len); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, false); } else { failed = true; } } /* * Yes the OpenSSL canon strangeness, is a concatenation * of all the RelativeDistinguishedName DER encodings, without * an outside wrapper. */ if (!failed) { len = -1; ret = asn1_der_coding (name, outer, NULL, &len, NULL); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_MEM_ERROR, false); offset = der->len; at = p11_buffer_append (der, len); return_val_if_fail (at != NULL, false); ret = asn1_der_coding (name, outer, at, &len, NULL); return_val_if_fail (ret == ASN1_SUCCESS, false); der->len = offset + len; } } asn1_delete_structure (&name); p11_buffer_uninit (&value); return !failed; } #ifdef OS_UNIX static char * symlink_for_subject_hash (p11_enumerate *ex) { unsigned char md[P11_DIGEST_SHA1_LEN]; p11_buffer der; CK_ATTRIBUTE *subject; unsigned long hash; char *linkname = NULL; subject = p11_attrs_find_valid (ex->attrs, CKA_SUBJECT); if (!subject || !subject->pValue || !subject->ulValueLen) return NULL; p11_buffer_init_full (&der, memdup (subject->pValue, subject->ulValueLen), subject->ulValueLen, 0, realloc, free); return_val_if_fail (der.data != NULL, NULL); if (p11_openssl_canon_name_der (ex->asn1_defs, &der)) { p11_digest_sha1 (md, der.data, der.len, NULL); hash = ( ((unsigned long)md[0] ) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; if (asprintf (&linkname, "%08lx", hash) < 0) return_val_if_reached (NULL); } p11_buffer_uninit (&der); return linkname; } static char * symlink_for_subject_old_hash (p11_enumerate *ex) { unsigned char md[P11_DIGEST_MD5_LEN]; CK_ATTRIBUTE *subject; unsigned long hash; char *linkname; subject = p11_attrs_find_valid (ex->attrs, CKA_SUBJECT); if (!subject) return NULL; p11_digest_md5 (md, subject->pValue, (size_t)subject->ulValueLen, NULL); hash = ( ((unsigned long)md[0] ) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) ) & 0xffffffffL; if (asprintf (&linkname, "%08lx", hash) < 0) return_val_if_reached (NULL); return linkname; } #endif /* OS_UNIX */ bool p11_extract_openssl_directory (p11_enumerate *ex, const char *destination) { char *filename; p11_save_file *file; p11_save_dir *dir; p11_buffer output; p11_buffer buf; bool ret = true; char *path; char *name; CK_RV rv; #ifdef OS_UNIX char *linkname; #endif dir = p11_save_open_directory (destination, ex->flags); if (dir == NULL) return false; p11_buffer_init (&buf, 0); p11_buffer_init (&output, 0); while ((rv = p11_kit_iter_next (ex->iter)) == CKR_OK) { if (!p11_buffer_reset (&buf, 1024)) return_val_if_reached (false); if (!p11_buffer_reset (&output, 2048)) return_val_if_reached (false); if (prepare_pem_contents (ex, &buf)) { if (!p11_pem_write (buf.data, buf.len, "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE", &output)) return_val_if_reached (false); name = p11_enumerate_filename (ex); return_val_if_fail (name != NULL, false); filename = NULL; path = NULL; ret = false; file = p11_save_open_file_in (dir, name, ".pem"); if (file != NULL) { ret = p11_save_write (file, output.data, output.len); if (!p11_save_finish_file (file, &path, ret)) ret = false; if (ret) filename = p11_path_base (path); } /* * The OpenSSL style c_rehash stuff * * Different versions of openssl build these hashes differently * so output both of them. Shouldn't cause confusion, because * multiple certificates can hash to the same link anyway, * and this is the reason for the trailing number after the dot. * * The trailing number is incremented p11_save_symlink_in() if it * conflicts with something we've already written out. * * On Windows no symlinks. */ #ifdef OS_UNIX if (ret) { linkname = symlink_for_subject_hash (ex); if (linkname) { ret = p11_save_symlink_in (dir, linkname, ".0", filename); free (linkname); } } if (ret) { linkname = symlink_for_subject_old_hash (ex); if (linkname) { ret = p11_save_symlink_in (dir, linkname, ".0", filename); free (linkname); } } #endif /* OS_UNIX */ free (filename); free (path); free (name); } if (!ret) break; } p11_buffer_uninit (&buf); p11_buffer_uninit (&output); if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_CANCEL) { p11_message ("failed to find certificates: %s", p11_kit_strerror (rv)); ret = false; } p11_save_finish_directory (dir, ret); return ret; }