| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
While it's true that we shouldn't be pritning out CKA_VALUE in
certain cases, like for keys, we obviously can do so for certificates.
We don't have keys anyway, but in the interest of being general
purpose use the class to determine whether CKA_VALUE can be printed
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This is documented in doc/internals/ subdirectory
Add tests for the format as well.
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=62156
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Fill in CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY properly for authorities
based on the presence of BasicConstraints and/or v1 certificates
* Fill in CKA_TRUSTED and CKA_X_DISTRUSTED based on whether the
parser is running for anchors or blacklist
* In addition support the concept of blacklisted certificates mixed
in with the anchors (without any purposes) since that's what exists
in the real world.
* We do this after the various hooks have had a chance to mess
with the certificate extensions and such.
|
| |
|
|
This is based off the roots-store from gnome-keyring and loads
certificates from a root directory and exposes them as PKCS#11
objects.
|